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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE
Collateral Estoppel-Scope of Prior Adjudication of Facts. In
East v. Fields,' an automobile insurance policy contained a provision
excluding coverage of accidents occurring while the car was being
driven by members of the armed forces other than the owner unless the
owner was present in the car. When an action was brought against
the owner for injuries suffered because of the negligent operation of
the car by a soldier-friend of the owner, the insurance company re-
fused the defense since both the owner and the driver signed state-
ments in which they declared the owner was not in the car at the time
of the accident.' In the tort action, the court found the defendant was
the owner of the car, that the driver was driving with the owner's
express permission, under his express direction, for and on behalf of
the owner, and the owner was present in the car at the time. These
facts supported the agency relation between the owner and the driver,
and allowed a judgment against the owner of the car.
In a subsequent garnishment proceeding against the insurance com-
pany, the trial court accepted the evidence of the insurance company
that the owner was not present at the time of the accident rather than
the finding of the court in the tort action, and dismissed the writ of
garnishment. Upon appeal, the judgment creditor claimed, and the
insurance company denied, that the findings of fact in the tort action
were res judicata in the garnishment proceeding. The court held that
res judicata did not apply since the causes of action for tort liability
and indemnity liability are different, but collateral estoppel was ap-
plicable to preclude the company from relitigating the question of the
owner's presence in the car since it was a fact essential to the tort
judgment and also decisive of the policy coverage.
That the owner's presence was essential to support the agency rela-
tion here is open to question. The liability of a car owner for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of someone driving his car with his
permission is based upon the doctrine of respondent superior. Estab-
lishment of the defendant's ownership of the car which causes the
injury raises a prima facie case against the owner. Proof of ownership
raises a presumption that the driver was the agent of the owner and
was driving within the scope of his authority at the time of the acci-
'42 Wn.2d 924, 259 P.2d 639 (1953).
2 Respondent's Brief, East v. Fields, note 1 supra.
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dent.' Although either interested or disinterested testimony can rebut
this presumption,' without rebutting testimony that is clear, convincing,
and unimpeached, the presumption will permit a verdict for the plain-
tiff.5 The presence of the owner strengthens the inference of agency
that arises upon proof of ownership,' but when such other facts as
express permission to drive under the express directions of the owner,
and for the benefit of the owner are present to bolster the presumption,
it is doubtful if the owner's presence is necessary at all to support a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Prior cases indicate that the court has been more liberal in allowing
a relitigation of a fact which supports a tort judgment in a subsequent
action to determine the indemnity liability of the insurer. Where
coverage of a policy excluded accidents to employees, and the employee
status of an injured person was a fact supporting the liability of the
owner of a car, the employee status found in the tort action was not
conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent action on the policy.7 In
another case, the tort judgment was supported by the ownership and
control of a truck driven by someone with the permission of the de-
fendant. In a subsequent action on the policy, the court allowed a
relitigation of the question of ownership without any thorough discus-
sion or application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' Although
both cases were discussed in respondent's brief, the court made no
reference to them, preferring to base its decision on a rather broad
interpretation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the fact that
"It would... be anomalous for a court to find such a critical fact one
way in the tort action, and to the opposite effect in the garnishment
proceeding."' The existence of an anomaly should be no reason for
perpetuating one version of a disputed fact when there is good reason
for believing that the other determination, based upon the litigation of
that particular fact, was the correct one.
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